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ENHANCING PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF
NUCLEAR DECISIONMAKING
SCOTT C. WHITNY*

The promotion and development of nuclear-generated electrical
power and the regulation necessary to assure safety and protect the
environment pose unique problems not elsewhere encountered in government. This situation does not arise simply because the regulation of
nuclear technology presupposes comprehension and decisionmaking
involving abstruse scientific and technical matters. Nor is it due merely
to the many critical issues posed by nuclear technology involving factual questions either at the leading edge of scientific inquiry or quite
simply beyond empirical verification at the present state of knowledge.
Unquestionably, with respect to some of the most critical issues, the
best available data consist of scientific hypotheses and probabilities, and
ultimate questions of safety are shrouded in a degree of uncertainty
and obscurity.
These imponderables become acutely critical by virtue of the truly
unique aspect of nuclear power-its lethal potentialities. Although there
has as yet been no fatality resulting from use of nuclear power to generate electricity, it is impossible to deny that there exists a chance, however infinitesimally remote, that a major nuclear catastrophe could
occur in or near one or more densely populated metropolitan areas.
Inflicting immediate widespread loss of life and incalculable long term
genetic damage, such a disaster could render significant areas of the
nation uninhabitable for decades or even centuries.'
Although such entities as the Patent Office, the National Academy
of Sciences, and other instrumentalities of government regularly deal
with complex scientific issues, and although an agency such as the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration has achieved signal
successes in fostering leading-edge technologies involving complexities
which rival those of nuclear physics, none of these agencies has had
to cope with potential health and safety impacts of the magnitude posed
*AB., University of Nevada; J.D., Harvard University. Professor of Law, The
College of William and Mary; Partner, Bechhoefer, Snapp, Sharlitt, Lyman & Whitney,
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1. Among the long-lived fission products resulting from nuclear power generation
are strontium-90 and cesium-137, with half-lives of 30 years, and plutonium-239, which
has a half-life of 24,400 years. See Gofman, The Case Against Nuclear Power,
CATALYSt, Number 3, 1972, at 18.
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by nuclear power generation. To be sure, a number of agencies, including the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Aviation
Administration, deal with subject matter directly affecting the health
and safety of significant numbers of citizens. Nevertheless, the impact
of an incident involving ingestion of impure or adulterated food or
toxic drugs, or even an airline accident, lethal as such events would be
to the persons immediately involved, cannot be compared in magnitude of scale or social importance to the consequences of a major escape
of nuclear debris in a densely populated metropolitan area.
It is thus the ultimate consequences at stake that have made nuclear
regulation the focus of an intense public concern somewhat on the
order of that about world peace. The nuclear regulator, whatever
agency format it may use, clearly faces a problem of public acceptance
far more critical than that facing most sister agencies regulating activities having lesser potential public impact.
From its beginning, the contradictory mix of Promethean possibilities
and doomsday risks inherent in nuclear technology has inspired in the
government's regulatory approach a sense of responsibility higher than
that prevailing in the regulation of other activities affected by a public
interest. However important it may be to protect shippers and travelers
from discrimination and unduly preferential or prejudicial transport
rates, or to protect investors from the sharp practices of stock manipulators, or to assure stability in banking practices and prevent unfair or
monopolistic trade practices, or to provide orderly competitive conditions in numerous important industries through controlled entry to a
wide variety of activities ranging from television to air transport services,
or even to assure pure food and drugs and safe airplanes and working
conditions, none of these activities decisively affects the ultimate survival of mankind on this planet in the same sense that nuclear technology does. Thus, in the years immediately following the first military
use of that technology, strenuous efforts were made, and indeed continue, to structure safeguards in the form of international test bans and
nonproliferation treaties to reduce the chance of large-scale nuclear
war. 2 Idealists during this period emphasized the need to concentrate
on peaceful uses of nuclear energy but failed to recognize that employment of nuclear technology even exclusively for peaceful uses would
entail grave risks.
2. See Bechhoefer, Historical Evolution of International Safeguards, in IThmATIoNAL
AND NucEAR INvismy 21-44 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
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As Professor Green aptly observes,3 the draftsmen of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 never envisioned the use of nuclear reactor licensing hearings as a forum for the resolution of issues of public health and
safety. Indeed, these architects of the regulatory structure devised to
preside over peaceful uses of nuclear energy detected no inherent conflict of interest in combining in a single agency the responsibility for
promoting and developing peaceful nuclear applications with the authority for regulating the nuclear industry to ensure compliance with statutory objectives and safeguards. It is probably not far off the mark to
assert that even today, after the widespread onslaught upon nuclear
regulation by antinuclear litigants, the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, convinced of the adequacy of the regulatory system conducted
under its surveillance, preserves a great part of its simplistic promotional zeal for expanding the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
Significantly, each of the contributors to this Symposium assumes
an expanded use of nuclear energy, especially in the generation of electrical power, for the remainder of this century and beyond. Three of
the four commentators (Professor Green excepted) advocate improvements designed to expedite existing licensing and regulatory procedures,
rather than the creation of a new and different decisionmaking apparatus. Despite the inherent hazards of nuclear energy, the existing
licensing and regulatory procedures, with or without the improvements
suggested in this Symposium, are quite similar to the procedures employed by many other "independent" agencies and descend from the
same judicial ancestry. The decision to cast the regulatory process of
the Atomic Energy Commission in the same mold as that of the other
independent agencies was made at a time when Congress and the public
did not fully appreciate the supreme irony that even peaceful uses of
nuclear energy pose grave risks to society.
Reliance on the adjudicatory hearing, or its near equivalent, the
hybrid adjudicatory rulemaking proceeding, assumes that the long established Anglo-American method of determining the truth through adversary litigation will adduce the kind of data necessary to make informed
nuclear decisions that will assure public safety. Of perhaps equal importance is the assumption that decisions reached in such adjudicatory proceedings not only will prove sound in the real world of nuclear mechanics
but also will gain the public's confidence by demonstrating the credibility of the nuclear decisionmaking process. In light of the critical
3. Green, Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing: -The IGreat
Delusion, 15 "AVrI.& MARY L. REv. 503, 510-11 (1974).
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need for attaining and maintaining this public confidence, an inquiry
into the validity of these assumptions is warranted.
At the outset, it is important to define the "public" which is concerned with nuclear regulation and whose confidence is so crucial.
There are in fact innumerable "publics" in the United States, which
vary in composition and size depending upon the issue or subject matter
involved. The public concerned with inflation or the cost of living
is undoubtedly far more numerous than the public concerned about
the impact of DDT on the world food chain or, a fortiori, the plight
of the kestrel. The size of the public concerned with nuclear power or
any other subject would expand greatly in the event of some public
disaster. Thus, public concern varies with the immediacy and degree of
impact any given subject has on the daily life and welfare of the populace.
It is probably fair to say that the public presently concerned with
nuclear power consists of a highly educated sector of society possessing
above average comprehension of scientific problems. Without doubt,
this public includes scientists, business and professional people, students,
and most environmentalists and conservationists. Other "ordinary"
citizens, including blue collar workers and lower income groups, living
near a nuclear reactor are also part of the interested public. While
portions of the public concerned with nuclear regulation devote significant amounts of available time and resources to expression of their
viewpoints, often in the form of litigation, others simply follow developments and occasionally support efforts they deem essential to a sound
nuclear policy. A significant number of those concerned are either
inalterably opposed to any nuclear establishment or advocate a degree
of proof of safeguard effectiveness beyond the capacity of the current
nuclear industry and the capability of present scientific knowledge.
Enhancement of public confidence in the nuclear decisionmaking
process thus must proceed on two levels. As to that sector of the public
that is not inalterably opposed to nuclear power, the objective should
be to establish that the regulator is conducting a rational program and
providing all safeguards available under the present state of scientific
knowledge. As will be indicated, this presupposes an "open" regulatory system admitting full public participation at the earliest possible
point in the nuclear facility licensing process. With respect to that
sector of the public opposing any nuclear applications, although some
converts may be won by granting open access to the regulatory process,
the regulator must assure that the regulatory process is sound and will
withstand legal attack and judicial review.
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It is also essential to understand what the public perceives to be the
risks of nuclear power generation. Some of these risks have been discussed by Professor Green in admirable detail and need only be enumerated here. The first is the risk to health and safety posed by the
"permissible" emission of low-level radiation resulting from normal
operation of nuclear reactors." The second is the possibility of a nuclear
catastrophe releasing extensive quantities of toxic debris into the atmosphere. The third is the nonradiological degradation of the environment
which may result from operation of nuclear power plantsY
Any risk inherent in low-level radiation emissions from normal reactor operation appears to have been handled in a comparatively satisfactory manner through a combined study and rulemaking initiative,
rather than through adjudicatory proceedings. Studies by the National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements and the National
Academy of Sciences 7 have marshalled what is known about the somatic
and genetic effects of radiation, and Part 20 of the AEC's regulations
sets forth standards for protection against radiation hazards applicable
to licensed activities. The distinctly lower key public reaction to the
issue of radiation levels, compared to the reaction to the possibility of
nuclear catastrophe, is perhaps explained by the essentially incomplete
state of knowledge with respect to the risks of exposure to low-level
radiation, the gradual and virtually imperceptible impact of whatever
hazard may exist, and the extension of any effects into the remote future.
Thus, social toleration of the risks of low-level emissions of radiation,
even where the existence of a risk is assumed, is not unlike social acceptance of the long term deleterious effects resulting from use of tobacco
or alcohol. Short term advantages appear to outweigh any long term
disadvantages, which generally are difficult to perceive.
Public reaction to the risk of nuclear catastrophe is quite another
matter. The consequences to the public would be immediately disastrous.
As a result, a vocal and well-informed antinuclear movement has attempted to block further nuclear development, as well as continuation of
existing operations. In stating the case against nuclear power, one commentator has asserted: "There is one way, and one way alone, to guarantee that nuclear disasters won't occur-simply do not produce this
4. Id. at 503-06.
5. See AEC Standards for Protection Against Radiation, 10 C.F.R. Part 20 (1973).
6. The primary risk in this category is thermal pollution. The Environmental Protection Agency recently published a notice of proposed rulemaking which undertakes
to cope with this problem. 39 Fed. Reg. 8293 (Mar. 4, 1974).
7. See Green, supra note 3, at 504 nn.4 & 5.
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astronomical inventory of long-lived radioactivity." 8 The antinuclear
movement gained momentum in 1970 with the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act," which permits members of the public
to challenge federal agency decisions substantially affecting any aspect
of the environment. The consequent injection into the AEC decisionmaking process of numerous complex environmental and safety issues
has increased significantly the time required for the licensing of nuclear
power plants. More recently, counterforces were set in motion when
the Arab oil boycott dramatized to the public the dependence of the
nation on foreign supplies of fossil fuel and the necessity of developing
other domestic power sources. In the words of Admiral Rickover:
"We are faced with the fact that while it took 600 millennia to create
the earth's deposits of fossil fuels, we are using them up in a time span
measured by decades.... The Fossil Fuel Age may well prove to have
been one of the briefest major epochs in man's long history on earth." 'o
President Nixon also has recognized that nonrenewable fossil resources
must be increasingly supplemented by nuclear power to meet the nation's future energy requirements." The Project Independence Report 2 makes abundantly clear that a heavy reliance on nuclear power
will be necessary during what may be a long transitional period between
the archaic fossil fuel system and the advent of an environmentally
clean and inexhaustible energy source. As a result the hard core opponents of nuclear power are now faced with the dilemma of having either
to withdraw total opposition to nuclear power or face the widespread
social and economic consequences, including widespread unemployment
and the possibility of a disastrous depression, if the nation is unable to
meet its energy needs while efforts are directed toward development
of nuclear fusion or some other ultimate power source. It is reasonably
clear that a major shortfall in meeting national energy needs would
impact a large segment of the general public and probably result in
a formidable popular backlash against the antinuclear and environmentalist movements. For this reason, it is of the highest importance
that the government alert its constituency to the need to develop an
expanded non-fossil fuel system (which for all practical purposes means
nuclear), demonstrate the realities of the risks to society that are in8. Gofman, supra note 1,at 18.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
10. R. LAPP, THE LOGARITHMIC CENTURY 43 (1973).
11. See President's Message to the Congress, 119 CoNG. REc. 57692, 7694-97 (daily ed.

Apr. 18, 1973).
12. AEC, REPORT

TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE NATION'S ENERGY FUTURE

vii (1973).
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volved, formulate and enforce a system of safeguards which are both
reliable and enjoy reasonably widespread public confidence, and, finally,
ensure that the regulatory system is capable of functioning within an
acceptable timeframe.
What then must be done to enhance public acceptance of nuclear
decisionmaldng? Until the current "energy crisis" the American public
was largely unaware that our domestic fossil fuel supplies, at present
consumption rates, would not satisfy current and forecast demands and
that substantial dependence upon foreign fuel supplies had become a
way of life. Even now there is less than full awareness that to maintain
necessary levels of economic activity this dependence on foreign fuel
supplies must increase and that, even if nuclear capability is substantially expanded, consumption of petroleum, primarily in the transportation sector, will still substantially exceed domestic production during
the 1980's and 1990's.' Thus, a major public information program is
imperative to inform the American public that even with extensive
development of kmown fossil fuel sources, including such resources as
oil shale and coal liquification and gasification, extensive nuclear development will be required to forestall unacceptable economic and social
consequences.
Once this fact of life has been established in the collective mentality
of the American public, the implications of widespread nuclear development must be made clear. One of the chief deficiencies in the prevailing nuclear regulatory system is its failure to disclose fully to the public
the risks and benefits of nuclear power. This is especially true in the
early stages of nuclear planning. Although the location of nuclear
plants is of the highest concern to the public, under the existing system
the public is denied participation in the site selection process. Legislation will be required to correct this deficiency. 4
Of equal concern is the exclusion of the public from the threshold
deliberations between experts retained by an applicant for a construction permit and the AEC regulatory staff. By the time the public normally begins to participate in the regulatory process, that is, at the
formal hearing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, site
selection has been completed (subject to final Licensing Board ap13. R. LAPP, supra note 10, at 38-39. See also DEPT. oF I.rEuoR, UNrrED STATES
E *ERGY TROUGH THE YEAR 2000 (1972), which forecasts the following shortfalls in

domestic petroleum production in relation to national requirements: 1975, 36.9 percent; 1980, 43.7 percent; 1985, 53.4 percent; and 2000, 70.3 percent. Id. at 10.
14. See Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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proval), and the regulatory staff and the applicant have arrived at an
agreed position on most, if not all, of the substantive details of the
proposed nuclear plant. Because these important agreements have been
reached out of the public view and usually without any significant public
input, except for possible comment on the draft environmental impact
statement, it is not unnatural that public intervenors regard the issuance
of a license as a fait accompli and their participation as a meaningless
sop granted for cosmetic purposes. This reaction is intensified by the
manner in which issues are defined and addressed in the conduct of the
hearing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, a matter validly
criticized by Professor Green. 15 As a consequence, public intervenors
feel justified in adopting "no win" dilatory tactics to obstruct the
progress of what they regard as a bureaucratic juggernaut. Excessive
delay and unnecessary cost result, and the "nuclear public" remains
unsatisfied that its interests have been adequately considered and protected.
These difficulties are compounded by the additional problem that
adjudicatory techniques such as cross-examination and rebuttal are not
ideal methods for adducing publicly comprehensible answers to a host
of important technical questions under consideration in a nuclear licensing proceeding. Historically, cross-examination has been used in twoparty litigation to resolve a limited number of comparatively simple
factual issues. The technique, however, is of limited utility in multiparty licensing cases, which involve an immense volume of complex data
embracing various specialized technical disciplines, require subtle judgmental determinations by hearing officers, and frequently entail a significant degree of subjective valuation of probable risks and future conditions. Given the exclusion of the public from the early planning
stages when most of the basic decisions are made concerning siting and
the basic structure and design of a nuclear plant, as well as the failure of
present procedures to provide at the hearing stage an opportunity for
effective and meaningful public participation, it is not remarkable that
the present licensing process does not command public credibility and
support.
Essential to a credible regulatory process is public awareness that expanded use of nuclear power is necessary to support the technology
upon which the nation's life style and economy depend. The American
public must be provided a full disclosure of the costs and benefits of
15. Green, supra note 3, at 514-17.
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the vastly enlarged nuclear establishment that will be required to meet
future energy needs. In particular, the risks created by nuclear technology must be forthrightly acknowledged. There is abundant proof
that the public is prepared to assume risks and substantial actual harm
if necessary to enjoy technological comforts and advantages. After all,
operation of motor vehicles in the single year 1971 resulted in some
55,000 fatalities; the over 1.76 million Americans killed in traffic accidents during the past 50 years is more than twice all American battle
deaths throughout the nation's history.'6 Moreover, it is widely recognized and accepted that operation of motor vehicles each year exposes
the public to the toxic discharge of millions of tons of carbon monoxide,
particulates, sulphur and nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and other more
exotic chemicals. In light of the public's willingness to accept these
known social costs of motor vehicles in order to receive the concomitant benefits, it would appear that full disclosure of the costs and
benefits of nuclear power could only tend to silence, rather than
exacerbate, environmental protest.
Once there is public awareness of the imperative need for and the
cost-benefit tradeoff inherent in nuclear power, the second necessary
step to establishing public confidence in the nuclear decisionmaking
process is widespread discussion of the extraordinary measures taken
at every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure against accidents. Much
public misgiving would be allayed simply as a result of increased awareness of the careful precautions that have been imposed on all phases of
the nuclear process.
In terms of specific applications, to inspire public confidence as well
as to provide a regulatory process with real-world effectiveness, it is
essential that the licensing process commence at the site selection stage.
This point in nuclear planning is critical not only for determining
questions of paramount public concern, such as who and how many
people will be exposed to adjacent nuclear activity, but also for resolving questions concerning general environmental effects, a task that cannot be approached in a meaningful manner except in the context of a
specific proposed site. The public has a legitimate claim to early participation in the regulatory process before planning decisions have been
cut in stone and options forfeited. The courts have recognized the
need to assess at the earliest possible moment the environmental impacts
of specific construction projects and even entire new technology pro16. R. LApp, supra note 10, at 31.
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grams.'1 7 This salutary policy must be adopted in nuclear power licensing and regulation as well.
Implementation of a threshold proceeding for evaluating and resolving siting issues would provide the public with early access to and participation in the decisionmaking process. This participation could be
achieved through intervention in the siting proceeding, by comment on
the environmental impact statement, or both. Early participation would
obviate the widely prevalent feeling that current licensing procedures
provide only for perfunctory, after the fact public consultation and
would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the need for extensive use of
cross-examination as a means of attempting to discredit already formulated private decisions.
Forthright public education through full disclosure and widespread
dissemination of the real-world cost-benefit tradeoffs involved in nuclear power, in combination with a threshold participation at site selection in really meaningful decisionmaldng, would contribute greatly to
the credibility and acceptability of nuclear power licensing decisions.
Moreover, such a procedure would supersede the need for the construction permit hearing if the plant used a previously approved standard reactor; an operating license proceeding would be necessary only
if an intervenor established a prima facie case for a hearing because
of new developments, and even then the hearing would be confined
to the issues so raised. As a result, the present long lead-times in nuclear
licensing could be substantially reduced.
Public confidence in such procedures would no doubt be enhanced
by the separation of the AEC's promotion and development mission
from its regulatory licensing and oversight functions. Although vesting
of regulatory power in an independent Nuclear Energy Commission
would not, by itself, assure public confidence, a full public disclosure
program, in conjunction with threshold siting hearings conducted by an
independent regulatory agency staffed by talent recognized as qualified, independent, and objective, would provide the best means available
in our form of government to achieve sound scientific decisions and
inspire necessary public confidence and acceptance.

17. Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973); see Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972); CEQ Guidelines, Preparation
of Environmental Impact Statements §§ 1500.2, -.6(d), -.6(e), 38 Fed. Reg. 20550-52
(Aug. 1, 1973).

